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LECTURE
THE A.A. SOMMER, JR. ANNUAL LECTURE ON
CORPORATE SECURITIES & FINANCIAL LAW
POST-ENRON AMERICA: AN SEC
PERSPECTIVE
WELCOMING REMARKS
DEAN TREANOR: Good evening, everyone. My name is
Bill Treanor. I am the Dean of Fordham Law School, and I would
like to welcome you.
This is, as you know, the Third Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr.
Corporate Securities & Financial Law Lecture.
I can tell you, as the Dean of the Law School for four months,
I am very aware of what a busy place this is and that this lecture
hall is in use virtually every night. But tonight's event stands out.
Tonight's event is a moment of great distinction, and I, like the rest
of you, am very excited to be here tonight.
Our lecturer is, of course, Harvey Goldschmid, Commissioner
of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), and it is a
real privilege to have Commissioner Goldschmid speak to us
tonight. He is a giant in legal academia. He is an award-winning
law professor. At the SEC he is at the very heart of the securities
world, and it is a privilege for us to have him here tonight.
I would like to acknowledge the law firm of Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius ("Morgan Lewis") for its role in tonight's events. The
firm has been extraordinarily helpful to the Law School. Through
its support, we have started a Corporate Securities and Financial
Law Center that is now really taking off under the directorship of
Professor Jill Fisch. It is one of the most exciting developments at
the Law School in my tenure as a faculty member and now as
Dean, and I am grateful to the firm for its support, and I am
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particularly grateful for its generosity in supporting the lecture.
This again is our third annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture. It
has become in a very short period of time one of the most central
contributions to the academic world that the Law School makes. It
is a tribute to A.A. Sommer, Jr., who was a giant in the field of
securities law. As Commissioner Goldschmid was saying to me
earlier tonight, this lecture series is really a very fitting tribute to
him.
Tonight we are joined by Mr. Sommer's widow, Starr Sommer,
and his daughter, Susie Futter. We are delighted that you are here
tonight, and we are delighted that we could pay tribute to A.A.
Sommer, Jr.
I am now going to turn matters over to one of our most
distinguished alumni, John F.X. Peloso, Fordham class of 1960 and
also one of the great resources of our Corporate Center. Through
his energy and commitment, it has really taken off, and he is also
one of the great stars of our adjunct faculty. We appreciate here at
the Law School his loyalty, his commitment, and his vision. The
Corporate Center, I think, is going to become a major player in the
world of corporate law and the world of securities law. It is going
to be and has become a real brain trust. So thank you, John, for
helping make it possible.
John is currently Senior Counsel in the New York office of
Morgan Lewis. He is a renowned trial lawyer whose career has
been dedicated to the many aspects of securities litigation.
Following graduation from our Law School, where he was
managing editor of the Fordham Law Review, he served as law
clerk to Judge McGowan of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York. From 1961 to 1965 he served as an
Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York, and
from 1970 to 1975 he was chief trial counsel for the New York
Regional Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
He has been a leader of the organized bar, holding important
positions in the Business Law and Litigation Sections of the
American Bar Association. He is presently on the panel of
arbitrators for the New York Stock Exchange, the National
Association of Securities Dealers, and is a distinguished neutral of
the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution.
As I said, John Peloso is currently Senior Counsel at Morgan
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Lewis, and he was originally brought to the firm by A.A. Sommer,
Jr. So it is very appropriate that I now turn matters over to him.
PROFESSOR PELOSO: Thank you, Dean Treanor. With
that introduction, I feel obliged to give a speech.
Actually, my role is very brief here this evening, which is
simply, on behalf of Morgan Lewis, to welcome you to the Third
Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture.
As many of you out there know, this lecture was established
three years ago by Morgan Lewis as a way of interacting with
Fordham Law School to encourage interest in securities and
financial law and as a stimulus for the creation of the Center for
Corporate Securities and Financial Law here at the school, which
has now really gotten off the ground.
We thought that a good way to do that was to have this lecture
in honor of the partner of Morgan Lewis who was really most
associated with the securities world and who was really the father
of the security practice at Morgan Lewis.
Al Sommer was a partner of Morgan Lewis for many years
when he retired in 1994. He was a practicing securities business
lawyer really all of his career, with time out to serve as a
distinguished member of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
But he was involved in so much more. He was active in many
associations, notably the American Bar Association, where he
chaired many of the important committees through the years, and
in connection with the accounting industry where, among other
things, he was chairman of the Public Oversight Board. He also
was an adjunct professor at a number of law schools, a prolific
author and commentator, and really a giant of the bar.
I must say as an aside that as I read the newspapers over the
past few months and saw the search going on for a chair of the new
Accounting Oversight Board, I could not help but think that Al
Sommer would have been the perfect chair because of his
experience and his integrity.
Al was here with us the past two years to introduce the
speaker. Between last year and this year, he succumbed to an
illness that was really debilitating, and he passed away. He is
represented tonight by his lovely wife, Starr, and his daughter, who
have come up from Washington for this, and we hope you will
continue to do that. You are so welcome.
2003]
338 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
In a way, Al will always be present here because the whole
idea is that this lecture will stand as a monument to him as one of
our great lawyers. Morgan Lewis is proud of its affiliation with Al
Sommer, and he with us, and pleased to host this lecture in his
honor.
We also want to say thank you to Commissioner Goldschmid
for coming up from Washington with a very busy schedule and
giving this lecture, and I know Al would have liked it, because
some of you may not know that they were old and close friends. So
thank you for coming up.
With that, I would like to introduce Professor Jill Fisch,
Director of the Corporate Center, who will introduce
Commissioner Goldschmid.
PROFESSOR FISCH: Good evening. I guess you cannot
have too many welcomes, so I too would like to take this
opportunity to welcome you to the Third Annual A.A. Sommer,
Jr., Lecture. I would like to echo Dean Treanor's remarks in
expressing our school's deep gratitude to the firm of Morgan Lewis
for their generosity in establishing the lecture. I would also like to
extend my personal thanks to John Peloso, not just for his
contributions and his work on the lecture, but for everything that
he has done to support the Center and the school's efforts to grow,
develop and inspire in the corporate securities and financial area.
I am delighted that members of Al Sommer's family are here
with us tonight, and I am really delighted that SEC Commissioner
Harvey Goldschmid, who is a dear friend, has taken the time out of
his schedule to come and join us.
As you know, the Sommer Lecture is really one of the crown
jewels of the recently established Fordham Center for Corporate
Securities and Financial Law. Somehow we have had the good
fortune and foresight during the lecture's short tradition of
identifying speakers who were able to offer us insights into some of
the most significant and timely issues affecting the business
community. And given everything that has been happening at the
Securities and Exchange Commission, tonight is no exception.
As with previous lectures, tonight's lecture will be published in
Fordham's specialized business journal, the Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law, and many of you have had the opportunity to meet
some of our student editors who are here tonight.
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More generally, we expect the lecture and the Corporate
Center to continue to build on Fordham's tradition and strengths
in business law, including its existing programs, the school's strong
faculty, the nearly four dozen courses in business law taught by our
full-time faculty and members of our adjunct faculty, the Securities
Arbitration Clinic, and the school's remarkable alumni base, which
includes the top leaders in the field of business law, many of whom
are here tonight.
It gives me particular pleasure to introduce SEC
Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid. I think the first time that I
really got to know Harvey was about ten years ago when he and I
worked together on the City Bar Association's amicus brief in
Central Bank v. First Interstate.! As many of you will recall, Central
Bank was the Supreme Court decision that eliminated private
liability for aiding and abetting federal securities fraud. Harvey
was counsel of record on the brief and the real leader in the
drafting effort.
I remember being struck, as a somewhat junior academic, by
both Harvey's desire to craft a workable standard of liability for
the Court and the leadership role that Harvey was able to play in
the drafting process. It really brought home to me the separate
role that academics can play in forming a bridge between the
independence, the analytic precision, and the integrity of the
academic world with the pressing issues that affect the practicing
bar and the business community.
Subsequent to Central Bank, I have had the privilege of
working with Harvey on numerous occasions, ranging from City
Bar projects and committees to the American Law Institute, to a
range of academic programs. Harvey served as a reporter for the
American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project for more
than a decade.
Prior to his current appointment as Commissioner, Harvey
had extensive experience at the SEC, including serving as SEC
General Counsel. During that time, he was influential in
developing Regulation FD,2 which prohibits selective disclosure to
1. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
2. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2000).
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securities analysts.
Harvey has also been active in SEC efforts to increase auditor
independence, a topic that continues to be of extreme importance
and public concern. Even before that, when the institutional
investor community was in an uproar over the Commission's
decision in Cracker Barrel,3 Harvey devoted part of a sabbatical to
volunteer at the SEC, to meet with issuers, institutions, and
activists in an effort to help moderate a possible compromise.
The meetings resulted in a comment letter jointly authored by
Ira Millstein that largely roadmapped the revisions to Rule
14(a)(8) that were subsequently adopted by the SEC.
Harvey is currently on leave from Columbia University where
he joined the faculty in 1970 and has been Dwight Professor of
Law since 1984. His many articles in corporate securities and
antitrust law have earned him the highest reputation in the
scholarly community. This reputation led academic commentators
uniformly to applaud the wisdom of his current appointment to the
Commission, and you know how rare it is for academics to agree
on anything.
Harvey graduated magna cum laude from both Columbia
University School of Law and Columbia College. I have benefited
personally from Harvey's warmth and generosity in acting as a
mentor to a young colleague. Fordham has also benefited from his
generous participation in many of our programs and events.
Two years ago, in one of the first Corporate Center programs,
we welcomed Harvey as a panelist in our inaugural Albert A.
DeStefano Lecture, which featured a panel discussion on
Regulation FD, on which, as you know, Harvey has real expertise.
It is worthy of note, as I look back, that just last week the SEC
announced its first Regulation FD enforcement actions. It is truly
a delight to welcome Harvey Goldschmid back to Fordham.
The SEC has a number of issues on its plate. Apart from the
recent turmoil involving the chairman and the debate about the
appropriate composition of the newly established Accounting
Review Board, the SEC has just released proposed rules
establishing the first federal standards of attorney conduct.
3. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, LEXIS
984 (Oct. 13,1992).
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The SEC has been actively working to address problems on
Wall Street, including a fluctuating relationship with New York
State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer in an effort to restructure the
role of the securities analyst.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002' requires the SEC to study or
develop rules to address a variety of perceived problems in
corporate governance and the securities industry.
I cannot think of anyone better suited to help lead the SEC
through these treacherous waters than Harvey Goldschmid.
FEATURED LECTURER
COMMISSIONER GOLDSCHMID: Thank you.
It is good to be here among so many friends, and I am
particularly honored to be asked to speak at this lecture. As Starr
and Susie know, Al Sommer was one of the people I most
respected in the world. Al was a gifted attorney, a warm and
generous friend, and an outstanding public servant.
I have titled this talk "Post-Enron America: An SEC
Perspective." I am not perfectly sure what I will do with my
subject, but let me tell you at least a little bit about Al first.
We met more than twenty years ago when I served as a
reporter for the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance
Project, and Al was an adviser. In later years, with Vic Futter (who
is here), we taught together in a seminar that Vic and I did uptown.
We worked together when Al was Chairman of the Public
Oversight Board and I was general counsel at the Commission.
Al was always generous with his time, full of insights,
extraordinarily knowledgeable, and uncommonly wise. He was a
remarkably effective leader of the bar and had the best of legal
instincts.
Al was also a Commissioner, as has been indicated, at the SEC
from 1973 into 1976, and here again we share common ground.
Both of us served in turbulent times. Al became a Commissioner
soon after Chairman G. Bradford Cook had resigned under fire.
Cook had spent only seventy-four days in office.
During Al's tenure, several serious corporate scandals
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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undermined the public's confidence in our capital markets.
Hundreds of corporations admitted to bribing foreign government
officials and making illegal political contributions off the
books-the so-called "questionable payments" scandals. In
addition, Penn Central had recently gone bankrupt. Penn Central
was the nation's largest bankruptcy since the 1930s. It was our
nation's largest railroad and the sixth-largest industrial corporation
at the time.
Notwithstanding those scandals, Al Sommer, the Commission,
and the Congress restored investor confidence. Obviously, I am
hopeful that the current Commission will achieve the same success.
One thing that will be a theme of the lecture is, "In the United
States, out of scandal comes reform." In the years following the
crash of Penn Central, there was a new focus on corporate
governance. Directors in a public corporation who once served
roughly thirty hours a year now spend well more than 150 hours on
the job. It is not a perfect system. But out of that, too, developed
the so-called monitoring model; again not perfect, but it improved
our corporate governance system enormously.
Out of the questionable payments scandals, which of course
were not questionable-most were illegal-came the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act in 1977,' and again in an imperfect world, it
made the anti-bribery situation considerably better.
Indeed, historically, the great strength of the U.S. system has
been its ability to reform and heal itself. During the period of our
worst financial scandals, from September 21, 1929, to July 1, 1932,
the value of stock listed on the New York Stock Exchange shrank
from $90 billion to just under $16 billion; from 1920 to 1930, half of
the new securities sold on the New York Stock Exchange turned
out to be worthless or virtually so.
The result was the 1933 Securities Act, the 1934 Securities and
Exchange Act,7 and the establishment of the SEC. These acts and
the Commission itself remain the foundations of our securities
regulation system today.
I am confident that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which the
5. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2002).
6. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z-3 (2002).
7. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2002).
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President signed on July 30, 2002, provides the right fundamental
framework for our current healing process. This landmark
legislation is the most important securities legislation since the
New Deal. It is now the job of the SEC is to implement it well, and
go beyond it. But it will provide the basis, I think, for restoring
investor faith in the integrity and fairness of our financial markets.
Before I tell you where I think we are heading, let me spend
some time on what went wrong during the 1990s and early 2000s.
Put bluntly, at least in my view, we witnessed systemic failure. The
checks and balances that we thought would be provided by
independent directors, independent auditors, securities analysts,
investment bankers, and-even before this audience I must add-
lawyers, too often failed. The regulatory checks represented by the
SEC and federal and state legal constraints also proved
inadequate, in meaningful part, I think, because of scarce resources
and overly protective case law and legislation.
When I was young, in 1998-1999, and general counsel of the
Commission, we saw some of the corporate governance problems
developing and tried to head them off. In those days, the economy
was robust, the stock markets were irrationally exuberant, and we
feared the toll that short-term profit pressures were taking on
corporate management.
Arthur Levitt-the first Sommer lecturer just two years
ago-gave a speech in September 1998, called "The Numbers
Game."8 Arthur focused on the pressure on corporate managers to
meet earnings expectations and the games that were being played
to meet those goals. He recited a series of accounting tricks that
worried us to no end. He talked about "big bath" charges, which
were restructuring charges; miscellaneous cookie-jar reserves; and
improper revenue recognition. The centerpiece of that speech was
the importance of corporate governance, and particularly,
corporate audit committees.
This was an old Commission theme. It picked up in 1940 with
the McKesson-Robbins investigation, and in a bipartisan way,
8. Arthur Levitt, The Numbers Game, Address at the NYU Center for Law
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worked through just about every commissioner and chairman over
the next fifty or sixty years.9
What do you get from an active audit committee? Please keep
my answer in mind, because it is very much a current theme of
Sarbanes-Oxley, the NASD and Nasdaq, and the New York Stock
Exchange in terms of what is being required for listing.
Some who champion the idea of an active audit committee say
it will stop venal, hard-core fraud. That I do not consider realistic.
An active audit committee will not, when acting alone, be able to
catch thieves in most circumstances. Even the most active and
effective auditors will have some trouble when hard-core fraud is
involved. There are techniques being developed today to try to
reach hard-core misconduct, including forensic auditing and other
techniques. But when no red flags are flying, even when an audit
committee acts reasonably, it will be difficult to spot fraud that is
concealed and hard-core. The dangers of hard-core fraud, in short,
will only be somewhat deterred or mitigated by an active audit
committee.
The real pay dirt in an active audit committee will come in the
presence of a dispassionate, independent view of the corporation's
long-term needs. Too often a CEO or CFO begins to feel earnings
pressure and says, "I need an extra five cents per share this
quarter." The wheels turn-and this is something we saw in 1998-
1999 and are seeing again today-and someone replies, "What
about reaching into the next quarter and taking some revenue?"
And the thought at the time is, "No one will notice; it may not be
proper, but no one will notice, and we will make it -up next
quarter." But then the next quarter is not good. And what started
as a kind of optimism about light at the end of the tunnel becomes
much more venal, and we get the kind of headline that we now see
in the business pages. An active audit committee can bring a
dispassionate, long-term perspective that ought to deter and
prevent this scenario of overreaching.
Put affirmatively, active, effective audit committees can
significantly enhance both the role of the independent auditor and
the transparency and integrity of financial disclosure.
9. In re McKesson & Robbins, Accounting Series Release No. 19, Exchange
Act Release No. 2707 (Dec. 5, 1940).
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The rest of the story is relatively well known. A distinguished
blue-ribbon committee was established." Ira Millstein and John
Whitehead chaired it. It had a group of eleven. They made ten
recommendations for corporate governance reform, which were, in
almost all respects, put into effect.
The blue-ribbon committee addressed three different groups.
One was the exchanges, our self-regulatory organizations
("SROs"), because in this country, we use listing requirements to
accomplish a lot of what state governments might otherwise do in
terms of setting forth mandatory rules of the game for corporate
governance. The report recommended, and the exchanges-the
NASD, the New York Stock Exchange, and the AMEX--put into
effect a strengthened independence definition for members of the
audit committee. Today the SROs are recommending the same
kind of independence requirements for compensation committees,
for nominating committees, and for a majority of the board. All of
this reflects basic corporate governance themes that began in 1970
with the downfall of Penn Central.
On the audit committee, the recommendation was that the
members, three persons, be financially literate, which the bar
worried a great deal about, but basically required only the ability
to read key financial documents, which is not very onerous; and at
least one member had to have accounting or financial expertise.
These requirements were enhanced in Sarbanes-Oxley, which put a
bit more emphasis on accounting expertise.
It is interesting. As Jill indicated, I spent most of my life
thinking about corporate governance, and I had always assumed
that the audit committee or the board was appointing the outside
auditor-hiring, evaluating, and, where necessary, firing the
outside auditor.
Empirically, however, as the blue-ribbon committee looked at
it, this assumption turned out to be flawed. And so the committee
recommended that the auditor appointment function be given to
10. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC, NYSE, and
NASD Announce Members of Blue Ribbon Committee to Improve Corporate
Audit Committees (Oct. 6, 1998), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/pressarchive/1998/98-98.txt (last visited Mar. 29,
2003).
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the audit committee and the board. In the kind of lawyers'
language we use, the committee asked that the board and audit
committee take ultimate responsibility for the appointment.
"Ultimate responsibility" meant do it. Interestingly, though, that
did not happen often enough. Sarbanes-Oxley now requires that
the audit committee take "direct responsibility" for appointing,
evaluating, and firing, if necessary, the outside auditor. This
establishes a relationship that ought to encourage more candid
communications by auditors and much more effective oversight by
the independent directors.
Other committee recommendations targeted the accounting
profession and involved the quality of numbers and the
independence of accountants.
The blue ribbon committee's recommendations were all tied
together in a package, as I left as general counsel, and the
Commission provided disclosure enhancements. We were all
relatively optimistic about the future in those days.
Arthur Levitt, soon after this all went into effect, was talking
about how active and revitalized audit committees had become.
And, indeed, the empirical evidence seemed to reflect the accuracy
of Arthur's view. A study done by CFO magazine in the summer
of 2001 indicated substantially increased audit committee activity."
That brings us to the most interesting question. If you think
about Enron and WorldCom and others, at least generically, what
went wrong? That also brings me to something I should have done
earlier. The comments I make today are my own and do not
necessarily represent the views of the Commission, my fellow
Commissioners, or the Commission staff.
Let me briefly review, and I can only do it briefly, what I think
went wrong in each key area during the 1990s and early 2000s.
Start with independent directors. The full facts will have to be
developed in the cases, both criminal and civil, that are moving
forward. But let me quote from the person who probably knows
most about what went on, Steve Cutler, who is Director of the
11. Stephen Barr, Life in a Fishbowl: Audit Committees Have Been Under
Intense Scrutiny-and Seem to Be the Better for It, CFO MAGAZINE, July 1, 2001,
available at http://www.cfo.com/article/1,5309,390511M190,00.html (last visited
Mar. 30, 2003).
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Division of Enforcement at the SEC.
He recently said the following: "Yet too often,... boards were
disinterested and disengaged .... They are dominated by
associates and friends of senior management .... Many outside
directors have lacked expertise in the relevant industry, and in
accounting and financial reporting issues. Thus, boards were too
rarely equipped to uncover and derail the determined efforts of'
management to cook the company's books."'2
Perhaps even more significant than those cited by Steve Cutler
are two additional factors: First, independent directors were left
inadequately informed, and thus exposed, because of the failures of
others-of auditors, lawyers, investment bankers, and even
research analysts. The monitoring model staffed by active,
independent directors continues to make sense. Indeed, I would
strengthen that model. But it cannot carry the load alone. It is
heavily dependent on proper disclosure and the effectiveness of
various gatekeepers.
Second, because of a series of regulatory, case law, and
legislative developments, directors may have been feeling too
insulated from legal vulnerability towards the end of the 1990s. I
do not want to expose them too much, but some incremental
incentive toward activity would have been helpful.
Turning to accountants and auditors, during the 1980s and
1990s, increasingly complex businesses turned more and more
often to their auditors for help with non-audit services, such as
asset valuations, merger advice, and computer system design and
implementation. But, when an accounting firm provides both audit
and extensive consulting services to an audit client, the auditor's
independence may well suffer, particularly when the consulting
services are significantly more lucrative and more voluminous than
the audit services.
An auditor who wants to retain an audit client's non-audit
business may be less likely to question management, and that is a
serious problem.
The average percentage of large accounting firm revenues in
12. Stephen M. Cutler, Remarks at the University of Michigan Law School
(Nov. 1, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch604.htm (last
visited Mar. 29, 2003).
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the United States attributed to accounting and auditing services fell
from fifty-five percent in 1988 to thirty-one percent in 1999.
Recent data-and I suggest that the data are quite
imperfect-reported to the SEC indicate that, on average, non-
audit fees of large public accounting firms comprise seventy-three
percent of total fees; in other words, $2.69 in non-audit fees for
every dollar of audit fees.
Adding to the independence problem was the cross-selling of
services. Seriously exacerbating the overall problem were
inadequate professional quality control systems, questionable
professional rulemaking processes, and an ineffective professional
disciplinary process. In sum, a serious failure of professional self-
regulation.
With respect to research analysts and investment bankers, I do
not have time to analyze the failings in any detail. But the words
"serious conflict," as well as a casual scanning of business-page
headlines, indicate my concern. At the heart of the problem
appears to be the fact that in the 1980s and 1990s, investment
banking was far more lucrative than research or other aspects of
Wall Street's business. To obtain lucrative investment banking
business, favorable analyst coverage, IPO spinning opportunities,
and other favors were provided.
Turning to lawyers, I wish I had more time to focus on the
changes in the culture and economic structure of the legal
profession. But for present purposes, I need only paraphrase
Judge Stanley Sporkin in the Lincoln Savings'3 case: "During the
most dramatic financial scandals that have occurred during my
professional life, where were the lawyers?"
Let me turn to an important area that has received little focus:
regulatory and legal checks. I am slightly biased, but I believe that
Arthur Levitt did as much as anyone could reasonably have
expected during the 1990s. He, for example, successfully pushed
corporate governance and audit committee reform, promulgated
Regulation FD,'4 enhanced corporate disclosure, and fought-with
limited success, but with courage and tenacity-to achieve
accounting profession reform. Many of Arthur's extraordinarily
13. Lincoln Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990).
14. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2000).
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wise warnings were unheeded at a time of seemingly endless
growth and optimism.
But then, as now, the Commission was sharply constrained by
inadequate resources. Now I will throw in a commercial. Today
no one should accept nomination to be the SEC's chairman
without first obtaining a Bush Administration pledge to support
something in the order of the $776 million budget authorized by
Sarbanes-Oxley. The SEC's budget was well less than $500 million
in fiscal year 2002. The New York Times was right yesterday: We
desperately need the money.15
Furthermore, the scandals in the 1990s and early 2000s
occurred against a backdrop of diminished exposure to liability
under both state and federal laws. In 1994 the Supreme Court, as
Jill indicated, eliminated aiding and abetting liability. Even before
that, the Supreme Court had shortened the statute of limitations
for securities fraud. And state legislatures enacted so-called shield
statutes to limit or eliminate director monetary liability for failures
of duties of care. I could make a case for almost every one of these
developments. What I cannot make a case for is their cumulative
effect. And the same can be said for the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.16 While it enacted a number of very
useful reforms, it placed new burdens on plaintiffs in securities
class actions.
Corporate directors and other gatekeepers act properly for
many reasons: pride, professionalism, reputation, et cetera. But
the cumulative effect of these regulatory, case law, and legislative
developments "made the legal risks"--and here I am quoting from
Steve Cutler again--"associated with abdicating their gatekeeping
role appear tolerable." Now, let me underscore those words:
"made the legal risks associated with abdicating their gatekeeping
role appear tolerable."
Where are we heading? Sarbanes-Oxley, as I indicated,
particularly when added to the Commission's prior statutory
authority, provides the SEC with very formidable power. The
15. Stephen Labaton, In Stormy Time, S.E.C. Is Facing Deeper Trouble, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 12, 2002, at 1.
16. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1
(1998).
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trick, of course, is for the Commission to diminish or end the
systemic problems I have identified without-and again I stress
these words-being economically foolish or otherwise creating
counterproductive effects.
I hasten to add that not all wisdom comes from Washington,
D.C. The SROs are taking important steps. The New York Stock
Exchange and Nasdaq, for example, have produced excellent
corporate governance proposals. New initiatives by independent
directors, institutional investors, and other shareholders are all
needed; new reforms by professional organizations will also be
necessary.
But let me run through where I think the Commission is
headed.
First, with respect to corporate governance and disclosure
accountability, the Commission's work to implement Sarbanes-
Oxley began on August 27, 2002. It was my first public meeting as
a Commissioner. We adopted rules requiring certifications by
CEOs and CFOs of the accuracy and completeness of a
corporation's financial information. Certifications with regard to
internal controls have now also been proposed.
More in the shadows, but of large consequence, are
requirements that public corporations maintain effective systems
- and I underscore the word "systems" - to assure the quality
and accuracy of their periodic reporting.
The emphasis on systems, on programs and procedures, takes
its inspiration from section 4.01 of the American Law Institute's
Principles of Corporate Governance and Delaware's 1996
Caremark decision. 7 This is a nice example of wisdom derived
from state law and scholarly commentary finding its way into
federal law.
In terms of increased director and officer accountability for
disclosure failures, please note that now available to the SEC or
the Department of Justice are: new disgorgement powers; easier-
to-obtain officer and director bars (prohibiting future service as an
officer or director of a public corporation); broad, equitable
remedial powers; and enhanced criminal sanctions for venal and
willful conduct.
17. In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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Also fully recognized now is the absolute necessity of a
vigorous, effective SEC enforcement program, particularly where
financial fraud may be involved. In 1999, the SEC brought
seventy-nine financial fraud cases, and that was a relatively robust
year. In fiscal 2002, we brought 163 such cases. Accountability and
deterrence have never been more central to the Commission's
mission and to our effort to restore investor confidence.
Again, I hasten to add that fairness, proportionality, and
concern about culpability count. It is critically important that
"good people" not be frightened away from service as officers or
directors of public companies. It is also critically important that we
not interfere unnecessarily with prudent risk-taking and the
entrepreneurial spirit. In this area, activity provides the basic
protection against legal exposure. Under the federal recklessness
standard, which is defined in the federal courts as an "extreme
departure" from standards of ordinary care, and under state duty
of care and business judgment rules, active, informed directors and
officers acting without loyalty conflicts will almost always be
shielded from liability.
In terms of disclosure and transparency, there will be
additional and better disclosure coming. Some of it is already here.
Management's discussion and analysis will have to focus on critical
accounting issues.
In November, we put out new disclosure proposals for special
purpose entities." More trend reporting is bound to occur. More
timely disclosure is going to be required. Again in an August 2002
meeting, the Commission accelerated annual and quarterly
reporting. Annual reporting had been required in ninety days after
the end of a public corporation's year. It has now been reduced,
over three years of transition, to sixty days, at least for large
issuers. Quarterly reporting was reduced, again taking account of
the need for transition, from forty-five to thirty-five days.
Directors and officers reporting the sale of stock used to take,
even when there was no cheating, roughly forty days. It is now two
18. Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis About Off-Balance
Sheet Arrangements, Contractual Obligations and Contingent Liabilities and
Commitments, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,054 (Nov. 8, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
228, 229 and 249).
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days. There is no reason for more, given our current ability to get
that information accurately and quickly into a computer.
There will be more review and monitoring of disclosure. That
has got to be the case. It will not catch everything, but it certainly
will create better disclosure and stronger incentives to do the right
thing.
Now, I must add a qualification with respect to faster
reporting. The key for me is not speed but accuracy. And also
with that goes the value of certainty and clarity. We do not want to
see inaccurate information disseminated because of harsh time
pressure. We certainly do not want to create a litigation morass.
But, at least where practicable, faster disclosure is properly on the
SEC's agenda.
At the heart of Sarbanes-Oxley is the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB"). I am not going to go
into detail, but I will give you a policy framework. The PCAOB
has the power to discipline, to do quality reviews, and to set rules
for auditing and independence. It is precisely what the accounting
profession badly needs.
It also will reestablish the credibility of our corporate
numbers. Confidence in the numbers is absolutely critical for
securities investment and for an efficient transactional system. The
PCAOB will help to restore and rebuild.
With a break, by April 26, 2003, when the SEC must recognize
the PCAOB, a new chair for that board will be in place. A chair of
the highest quality and integrity is absolutely essential to
reestablish trust in our financial numbers and in the accounting
profession.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") is also
going to be more independent. Because of Sarbanes-Oxley, FASB,
which sets accounting rules, will now be funded in the same way as
the PCAOB. It will no longer be forced to go hat-in-hand to any
constituency.
The SEC is now studying the roles of research analysts and
investment bankers. I have time today to indicate only my
understanding of the critical need to restore investor confidence in
these areas too.
New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, whose name
came up earlier, performed a large and most important national
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service in training a spotlight on analyst conflicts. In the long run,
however, we will need an SEC rulemaking. It makes no sense to
have fifty-two different sets of rules for analysts and investment
bankers. I have recommended to my colleagues on the
Commission that we undertake a comprehensive rulemaking to
establish rigorous, uniform, national standards, and I hope we will
move forward on that in the not too distant future.
Let me turn to lawyers as gatekeepers. There is, I believe, a
broad consensus that lawyers should play a critical gatekeeping
role in large public corporations. In the 21st century, in the wake
of Enron, how should we think about that role?
Well, Congress made some of our thinking easier. In section
307 of Sarbanes-Oxley, 9 Congress told the SEC to establish
minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys
appearing before the Commission. Sarbanes-Oxley goes on to
mandate-and I underscore the word "mandate"-a reporting-up
system in terms of the corporate chain of command, or "ladder"-
the word used in a recent SEC release.
I have no doubt about the validity and wisdom of that basic
approach. It is consistent with corporate governance developments
over the past thirty years, and requires independent, dispassionate
directors-and not managers alone-to resolve important legal
issues that could cause material harm to the corporation. Indeed,
although I acknowledge its ambiguity, Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.1320 has strongly suggested reporting up for the last
twenty years. Though it is not in effect in New York, there is no
doubt in my mind that New York ethical authorities would accept
the Model Rule's approach. Of course-and this is a matter not
free from controversy--Congress has now mandated reporting up
as a matter of federal law, with SEC sanctions and remedies
available.
The most significant additional issue raised in the SEC's recent
rulemaking is a "reporting-out" provision. No one should doubt
the complexity and difficulty of the so-called "noisy withdrawal"
issue.
19. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745
(2002).
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.13 (1983).
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But assume serious securities fraud or looting is occurring.
Involved is extremely harmful, ongoing wrongdoing. In what I
believe would be a most unusual circumstance, assume the
wrongdoing has been reported up the corporate chain of
command, but the directors and officers have refused to take any
action.
Model Rule 1.62 -and this is one of the reasons the Model
Rules were not adopted in New York-adopted by the ABA in
1983 and reaffirmed by the ABA in the summer of 2001, basically
precludes a lawyer from reporting out the ongoing financial fraud.
I recognize the need for full and frank communication by
lawyers and their clients. I am also comfortable putting heavy
weight on the value of confidentiality with respect to the past,
where wrongdoing has ended. But for me, an absolute emphasis
on confidentiality-where ongoing financial fraud is involved-is
incomprehensibly out of balance.
Such an absolute emphasis is at odds with sound public policy.
It is contrary to the duties we now place on accountants and on
directors. How can such an emphasis on confidentiality be
reconciled with the Commission's traditional mandate, reinforced
in Sarbanes-Oxley, to protect investors and the public interest?
In general, the proposing release on minimum standards of
professional conduct for attorneys reaches reasonable conclusions
on numerous difficult issues. I emphasized, however, when I voted
for it, that I had doubts about specific aspects, particularly its
triggering provisions, breadth, and scope. Everyone in this room is
much more than welcome to provide comments.
Let me finish on one last point. Jill mentioned our Central
Bank of Denver brief in 1994. Congress restored aiding and
abetting authority for the SEC in 1995. That was wise.
Think of a situation, though, because aiding and abetting is
still not available in private litigation, where a corporation commits
financial fraud. It does so knowingly. Moreover, it does so with
the knowing and substantial assistance of lawyers. The lawyers, for
example, have submitted opinion letters that made the accountants
go the wrong way: the lawyers knew they were providing
substantial assistance to financial fraud.
21. Id. R. 1.6.
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We can reach that at the SEC, but we have limited powers
with respect to investor compensation. How would we explain to
the public, if my scenario were to occur, why aiding and abetting
liability for private actions under section 10(b) has not been
restored?
The Supreme Court in 1994 did not say that aiding and
abetting was not important to the law. The majority of five justices
merely said, "We have looked at section 10(b)' and we just do not
see the words." They, in effect, invited Congress to act. The right
thing was done for the SEC in 1995. In my view, it is time for
Congress to drop the other shoe and provide aiding and abetting
liability, very carefully defined, in private actions.
Let me close on an optimistic note. The Enron scandals have
compelled us to face serious systemic imperfections. Our checks-
and-balances system too often failed. But the Enron scandals have
also provided us with a critical stimulus to bring about healing and
reform. In the end, I suspect, post-Enron developments will permit
the United States to maintain and strengthen its status as the
world's leader in both corporate accountability and financial
disclosure.
Thank you.
QUESTIONER: I would like to focus on the role of the
independent director. How do we insulate that director when he
starts exercising that independence? How do we prevent him from
being eased out by still another independent director who is
friendlier once he starts stepping on toes?
COMMISSIONER GOLDSCHMID: Well, that is a
traditionally difficult question.
Let me start even further back than that. Every definition we
have of independent director-and I have had my hand in many of
them-is going to be imperfect. You can define independent
director by excluding financial conflicts, family connections, work
at the company, and you know that there is a next-door neighbor
who is not ever going to ask a hard question. Yet he or she will
pass in terms of any objective test.
On the other hand, I have known a number of senior
corporate executives who would say to me, and I believed them, "If
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951).
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anyone is going to ask the CEO a tough question, it is going to be
me."
And yet we say, by definition, inside officers cannot be
classified as independent directors. Some of them will be quite
independent in the real world. But you are making judgments
based on a "more likely than not" analysis. If you have somebody
who works inside, the chances are he or she will be much more
responsive to, and inhibited by, a tough CEO than would an
outsider.
How do you turn objectively independent directors into truly
active, effective directors? One real possibility, of course, is to
encourage and facilitate more oversight from institutional and
other sophisticated investors. Another is to give independent
directors real opportunities to assert themselves. One process
change that has had a dramatic effect is independent directors
meeting alone. If you look at CEO replacements that have
occurred in some of our major corporations, from GM to IBM to
American Express, they began with outside directors sitting
together and communicating their concerns without the inhibiting
presence of the CEO.
I am not sure how to deal with disputes among outside
directors. Those who believe in current management could turn
out to be correct. But I do have faith that, in an imperfect world,
having a majority of independent directors, and having the audit
committee, the compensation, and the nominating committee in
the hands of those directors, will make the system work better.
QUESTIONER: A follow-up: I know in connection with the
independent auditors, many years ago whenever an auditor was
changed, they had to report why they were changing, and whether
it involved a disagreement on accounting.
Perhaps you could have the same law for independent
directors. If an independent director is eased out, perhaps you
could have a similar disclosure or oversight.
COMMISSIONER GOLDSCHMID: That would be one way
of at least reaching your concern. The question always is how
much disclosure is effective and how much will you gain; the other
side, of course, is cost.
In my experience, seeing the problem is relatively easy in area
after area. Providing solutions that are going do more good than
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harm, and that are cost effective, is more difficult. But certainly
your suggestion is worth thinking about.
We are going to use that technique with lawyers. They are
going to have to report up, and there is also the so-called "noisy
withdrawal" proposal, if the board does not provide an appropriate
response to a material violation.
QUESTIONER: I was delighted that you confirmed the
Caremark theme behind the audit provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley. I
am wondering if you might expand now a little bit about what the
roadmap ahead might be, whether there might be a journey in
which the exchange is to draw out some of what the processes, the
systems, should be, whether the SEC might write some rules
including a requirement to disclose and a Caremark report. Where
do you think it might go?
COMMISSIONER GOLDSCHMID: Well, you have got to be
careful-this may show the conservative in me-not to stipulate
too much. There is a one-size-fits-all problem, and therefore, we
did not rigidly specify what an internal control system or a
disclosure reporting system would look like. I had a hand in that
ALI drafting in section 4.01, and again, what we did is said, "Work
out programs and procedures that make sense in the context of
your corporation, but be serious about it."
QUESTIONER: Right now the regulators have been meeting
with the largest brokerages to settle those analyst investigations,
and they are talking about what I thought were new possible rules
regarding analysts. If the SEC were to take this to rulemaking,
what would it mean for whatever the larger firms agree to?
COMMISSIONER GOLDSCHMID: Well, the process that
you have read about-and I wish you were not reading so much
about it-I am religious about not talking about enforcement--is
one looking at potential enforcement matters. That is correcting
something that may have gone wrong. That may involve five or ten
or whatever number of firms.
The larger problem in a world where you have over 7,000
broker-dealers is how do you set up a system that works across-the-
board. Now, the SROs have offered some good proposals. There
were rules approved for analysts in May; this represents a good
start. There is another set that is coming before the Commission.
But I think it important that the Commission step back and
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say, "What do we really need across-the-board in these areas?"
The only thing I am absolutely sure of is that there ought to be one
rigorous, comprehensive set of rules for the nation. Those rules
ought to be binding; they ought to be rigorous; they ought to be
national; and they ought to be uniform.
QUESTIONER: So would the SEC essentially down the road
render whatever they agree to and say this enforcement action is
relevant?
COMMISSIONER GOLDSCHMID: The enforcement action,
if all goes well, will correct whatever problems have been found,
but anything that is determined in an enforcement action would be
subject to the SEC's ability to make rules that are binding across-
the-board, and presumably, at least if I have my way, any
conceivable settlement would be premised on adherence to any
SEC rulemaking made at a later time.
Now, you might, I should add, go further in an enforcement
matter than you would in rulemaking for more than 7,000 broker-
dealers. In an enforcement context, you are remedying something
that has gone wrong.
QUESTIONER: With all the pressures coming on audit
committees now-particularly you mentioned the critical
accounting policies and other things that you have to look at--do
you think that it is going to become more common to them to
retain their own outside accounting and lead counsel separate from
the corporate counsel?
COMMISSIONER GOLDSCHMID: Yes, but it may not be
wise for audit committees to do that as a routine matter. I think it
may be costly, particularly if a redo of an audit is contemplated;
again, we want to think about costs to the system. But certainly
there are going to be occasions-more often than in the past-
where audit committees are going to want to say, "We need our
own accounting look; we need our own legal look."
QUESTIONER: You were talking about some of the failures,
some of the suggestions towards enhancing more checks and
balances and what went wrong before Enron and what we can do
after that. You just reminded me that about a year ago there was a
Sunday New York Times article about the auto industry, the whole
effect of regulation in the auto industry toward rollovers and how a
particular lawyer on the plaintiff's side had almost effectively done
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what the government should have done in enforcing the redesign
of Ford Motor. That was the object.
And so taking my analogy, as they teach us to do at Fordham
Law School, it occurred to me that with the budget problems in its
enforcement, and providing ammunition for the SEC and other
regulatory agencies that when I look back at it, I just wonder has
the defense bar done too good a job in this checks and balances
when you look at the height and feeding requirements of the
PSLRA and all the other things?
Specifically, before Enron there was a tendency to roll your
eyes and say, "Here is another gadfly; here is that firm whose name
shall not be mentioned where the problems began, only doing it for
money." But, when I get into a Ford Explorer now, I do not really
care that some plaintiff's lawyer made a lot of money because I feel
safer because the government did do its job.
I am wondering as the investing public, as defense bar, as the
insiders, have we tilted it a little bit too much? I mean, should
there be ways for us to bring the balance back so that the average
buyer or shareholder can feel a certain comfort that if the SEC
does not have the budget that somebody else will go after them; is
there is an incentive there?
COMMISSIONER GOLDSCHMID: Oh, yes. The traditional
SEC view, which I fully believe in, is that private actions are a
necessary supplement to make the securities laws work. The SEC
has been able to bring 400 to 500 cases each year. In fiscal 2002,
pushed enormously by all of the scandal out there, we have gotten
up to 600 cases. But it does stretch the staff thin. If we get the
$750 million-plus budget I think we need, the SEC will still not be
able to begin to do it all.
On the other hand, there is in my mind a real need to make
sure we do not let private litigation become offensive in terms of
the validity of the claims made.
One real advantage of the 1995 PSLRA was that it told private
plaintiffs' lawyers that, in effect, you need a client, and that
institutional investors should often play a lead plaintiff role. It
stopped the race to the courthouse, which decided who would
become lead counsel. Getting rid of that was a national blessing.
I do not think the PSLRA's strong inference standard has
done much harm. There was enormous danger there. But if I can
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be immodest, when I was general counsel in 1998-1999, the SEC
went from circuit to circuit indicating the recklessness standard had
to be retained. I argued two of the key cases, one in the Second
Circuit and one in the Sixth Circuit. We won just about all of those
cases, and the recklessness standard and rational pleading
standards were generally preserved. I am still worried about a few
issues, particularly in the Ninth Circuit. In general, private
litigation -including class actions-makes all the sense in the
world. It is the only way of compensating people who are badly
hurt. And the talent and intelligence of plaintiffs' lawyers can be
an enormous supplement to what the SEC can do.
On the other hand, you do not want meritless cases going
forward. One of the good things the 1995 PSLRA has done, in
using the strong inference standard that came from the Second
Circuit, is to allow courts to get rid of weak cases early.
Something like twenty to thirty percent of cases are now being
dismissed either at the motion-to-dismiss stage or at early summary
judgment stages. If all is going well-and that is what we have to
study-we are getting rid of weak cases and not those with
substantial merit. But I fully believe that plaintiffs' private actions
are critical to making the securities laws work.
QUESTIONER: When the Accounting Board gets up to
speed, what do we know and what do we not know about the
relationship and the interplay between the SEC and the
Accounting Board?
COMMISSIONER GOLDSCHMID: What we know is that
the SEC has oversight authority on every key area. Everything
they do in terms of rulemaking will have to be approved by the
SEC.
On the other hand, there is an immense amount of wisdom, if
the Commission has confidence in the board, to give it room and
discretion. I would think if we have confidence in the board-and
there are four very good members there now, and hopefully we
select the right chair--our oversight would be gentle and
deferential.
QUESTION: The day after Judge Webster was named as the
chair of the PCAOB there was a quote from ex-accountant, chief
accountant Lynn Turner in most of the major newspapers saying,
"If I was an investor, I would move all my money into money
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markets."
Do you get the sense that the work of the Commission has
become increasingly politicized over the past year?
COMMISSIONER GOLDSCHMID: Should I touch that
question?
Let me take you back in history. I mean, the last time the SEC
was in this kind of spotlight was when Joe Kennedy became chair
in 1935. People do not realize it, but Joe Kennedy's first
speech-and of course this involved radio-was to a national
audience. Clearly, the amount of negative public focus is a
problem, but I do not think anything we did, being as candid as I
can with myself, had anything to do with politics.
Fundamentally, when it came to the Accounting Oversight
Board, I had been saying from the beginning that this was the most
important thing the Commission would do within the next year.
Bill Webster was a particular problem for me. Bill is an old
friend, and I have enormous admiration and regard for him. The
problem is that he had a limited background here. He had not
dealt with these issues, and had not taken part in the debate that
occurred nationally over the last few years. He was coming in
under a shadow, under what was clearly a perception, and I think
probably a reality, of heavy industry pressure.
One of the things that became clear to me as the dispute
developed was that Harvey Pitt and I had made the right decision
in stating on September 11, 2002, that we each would support John
Biggs. John was a superb choice. He was moderate; he knew these
issues; he was very active on these issues; and he had an integrity, a
decency, and an acceptance that was immense across the nation.
This was not political. The Wall Street Journal had written three
excellent editorials about John Biggs being the right person to do
this job.' You could go to newspapers throughout the country,
Democratic, Republican, of every stripe, saying this is the right
man.
Losing John, at least insofar as we have lost him-we have
another chance-was a loss not because of anything political but
23. Fighting Mr. Biggs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2002, at A12; Cleaning Up
Dodge, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2002, at A14; Using Judge Webster, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 24, 2002, at A16.
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because for me he was clearly the right man to do this enormously
important job. His not getting the job in the atmosphere-because
of industry and other pressures -was a tragic mistake.
But everyone should remember that Bill Webster is a good
and decent man who has been an immensely important public
servant.
I think I will end with that. Thank you.
